Using the change in ordinary dividend payout as a proxy for improved governance, I show that cross-listing in the U.S. is associated with enhanced protection for the minority ordinary shareholders of exchange listed non-U.S. firms. These firms substitute dividends for enhanced governance. I find no such effect for Rule 144a firms. Interestingly, I document evidence inconsistent with the legal bonding hypothesis for Level 1 firms. I believe that their ability to pay lower dividends post-listing is primarily due to their ability to credibly commit to fair treatment of their minority investors, given their record for equitable treatment of their ordinary shareholders. They achieve this reputation by consistently paying out a sizable proportion of their earnings as dividends. I find that the firm-level governance of Level 1 firms, as measured by the number of closely held shares improves in the post-listing period. I find no such effect for Rule 144a traded firms. My results also have important implications for the agency models of dividends.
Introduction
The ability of firms to finance investment opportunities, over and above retained earnings is largely contingent on the effectiveness of their domestic legal system to sufficiently protect minority shareholders. The extant literature suggests that where the providers of capital are sufficiently protected, their required return is lower resulting in a lower cost of both debt and equity capital for firms (e.g., Hail and Leuz (2003) ).
Consequently, high-growth firms domiciled in countries characterised by poor legal institutional frameworks, and thus poor investor protection, are very often constrained in their attempts to finance their growth opportunities externally (e.g., Demerguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998)). Absent effective legal reform, many firms engage in substitute strategies designed to fund their investment opportunity set. For example, the extant literature suggests that such firms can engage in cross-border strategic alliances (e.g., Siegel (2006) (2004)). Consequently, the ability of firms to finance their growth opportunities through domestic financing, post-listing in the U.S., suggests a commitment on the part of firms to better protect their investors 1 By 'opting-in' to the U.S. governance regime, these firms endeavour to encourage investment in their firm by committing to adopt the reporting obligations of U.S. firms. As such, the legal bonding hypothesis suggests that at least in terms of investor protection, investors should be indifferent between investing in U.S. firms or non-U.S. American depositary receipts. However, this line of reasoning has been questioned within the literature. For example, its most vocal critics (e.g., Siegel (2004) , Licht (2003 Licht ( , 2004 ) consistently argue that the number of SEC actions against ill-behaved foreign firms has been few, and Licht (2003) goes so far as to suggest that the enforcement laws put in place by the SEC remain largely 'illusionary' for non-U.S. firms, as non-U.S.
firms are subjected to a less stringent regime than that laid out for U.S. firms. In connection, Siegel (2004) outlines that over the period from 1995 to 2001 the SEC took legal action against just five foreign firms 2 I examine whether cross-listing in the U.S. affords additional protection to those investors who have already made the investment decision and invested in the firm i.e. the ordinary shareholders, as opposed to those 1 Ribstein (2005) outlines other alternatives to cross listing. These include certification, a sale without listing and local incorporation. In addition, a related literature outlines how domestic exchanges have in response to sizable migrations of firms to U.S. capital markets improved their governance requirements. Dewenter, Kim, Lim, and Novaes (2005) and Carvalho and Pennacchi (2005) examine the impact of enhanced stock exchange governance regulations on firm value using Korean and Brazilian exchanges, respectively. They show that improved exchange governance enhances firm value. In a similar vein, Krishnamurti, Sequeira, and Fangjian (2003) using the two major Indian stock exchanges demonstrate how demutualized exchanges are superior to mutualized exchanges in terms of governance. 2 Joos (2003, p. 396) concludes that "At the very least, empirical work suggests that the effectiveness of the bonding role of the SEC regulation presents an empirical question rather than an established fact".
investors that invest post-listing i.e. ADR holders. The majority of non-U.S. firms that 'opt-in' to the U.S. governance regime do not 'opt-out' of their domestic regime. So while it is clear that the ADR holders are protected, although not to the same extent as those investors that hold U.S. firms, it is not clear whether the holders of the firms' ordinary shares enjoy the same level of additional investor protection. In fact, Aggarwal, Dahiya, and Klapper (2005, p.3) suggest, "ADR holders have better legal standing compared to holders of the underlying security as the ADRs are purchased in the U.S". I examine whether the ordinary shareholders i.e. the holders of the underlying security enjoy any incremental protection under the U.S. governance regime.
In order to examine whether cross listing in the U.S. provides incremental protection for minority/ordinary shareholders, I follow the approach advocated by Benos and Weisbach (2004, p. 229) . They argue that, given that regulatory bonding in the U.S. is unobservable to the researcher, "the issue of economic importance is whether managers and investors perceive cross-listings to have incremental protection or not. To examine this proposition, the appropriate approach is not to count SEC actions and debate whether they are important or not. Rather it is to examine the data for empirical implications of the hypothesis that cross-listings provide incremental protection, and therefore serve as a device enabling managers of non-U.S. firms to commit to protect the interests of their minority shareholders".
I examine the ordinary dividend payout of cross-listed firms around a cross-listing in the U.S. Our choice of variable is motivated by the fact that dividend payout is increasing in the level of investor protection (e.g., LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifler, and Vishny (2000, LLSV Hereafter)) and, consequently changes in external investor protection are associated with changes in firm dividend payout (e.g., Liu (2002)), controlling for firm, industry and country level determinants of dividend payout. In addition, the choice of dependent variable is motivated by my desire to isolate the impact of cross listing on the domestic/ordinary shareholders (as against the ADR shareholders) of cross-listed firms. I employ the ordinary dividend payout of firms to achieve this goal.
The agency models of dividends do not rely on specific rights per se, but rest on the premise that country laws and/or governance practices allow minority shareholders greater rights in general. I argue that firms may only pay lower dividends if they perceive that their minority investors will accept lower dividends for improvements in investor protection, as dividend cuts are costly. Minority/ordinary shareholders are more likely to accept lower dividends post-listing if they are compensated for reduced dividends with enhanced protection from listing in the U.S. Easterbrook (1984) outlined how governance practices and dividends are substitutes for one another.
I argue that the additional protection afforded to minority investors from listing in the U.S. derive not only from additional general rights per se, but also from a reduced ability of controlling insiders to consume private benefits (e.g., Barzuza (2005) , Doidge (2004) , DKLMS (2005) ).
Using a sample of 496 cross-listed firms from forty countries, I find that exchange-listed firms pay significantly lower dividends, post-listing, and this finding is robust to the inclusion of firm, industry and country controls. This result is consistent with the notion that these investors are better protected under the U.S. regime, and suggests that both managers and investors "perceive cross-listings to have incremental protection". In line with my expectations, I find no evidence to suggest that the ordinary shareholders of Rule 144a firms benefit from incremental protection, post-listing. Interestingly, my results suggest that the minority investors of Level 1 firms are better protected. Although inconsistent with the legal bonding hypothesis, I show that these firms consistently establish a reputation for better protection of their investors by paying out a greater proportion of their earnings as dividends. Consequently, their ability to pay lower dividends post-listing may well result from a voluntary commitment on the part of these firms to protect their investors that is credible given their reputation for fair treatment. In support of this argument I find that the firm-level governance of Level 1 firms, as measured by the number of closely held shares improves in the post-listing period. I find no such effect for Rule 144a-traded firms.
My results have also important implications for the agency models of dividends. I find support for both the outcome and substitution models of dividends. More specifically, I find that in all cross-sectional periods, and over the full sample period, dividend payouts are significantly higher in countries where minority investors 3 . This of course suggests that the relation between dividend payouts and governance is nonconstant and as such purely cross-sectional tests are biased towards acceptance of the outcome model of dividends. My results suggest that both models are not directly competing against one another.
Cross-listing in the United States and the legal bonding hypothesis
Non-U.S. firms can cross-list in the U.S., either directly as ordinary shares or as American Depositary Receipts (ADR). Absent Canadian and Israeli firms, the majority of non-U.S. firms list as ADRs. A sponsored, public Level 1 OTC depositary receipt program is the simplest way for non-US firms to access U.S. and non-U.S. capital markets. They trade 'over-the-counter' and also on some exchanges outside of the U.S., with prices published on the "Pink Sheets". A Rule 144A depositary receipt program, established by the SEC in 1990 facilitates access to U.S. and non-U.S. markets through a private placement of sponsored depositary receipts to Qualified Institutional Buyers. Trades are executed under the Portal system, and cleared through the Depositary Receipt Trust. Like Level 1 issues, they do not require compliance with U.S. G.A.A.P. or SEC registration. Under Regulation S, a company can offer a depositary receipt program to non-US investors on Designated Offshore Securities Markets 'DOSM'. Unlike Level 1 or Rule144a ADRs, cross-listing in the U.S. via a Level 2/3 exchange-listed ADR (or a direct listing on a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ) obligates these firms to provide fuller disclosures under U.S. G.A.A.P., and operate under the mantra of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), thus becoming subject to their enforcement powers. Furthermore, cross-listing in the U.S. also affords minority investors the means to exercise effective and low-cost legal remedies, unavailable at home, and exposes the firms to what Coffee (2002) terms "Reputational Intermediaries": underwriters (in the case of Level 3 capital-raising firms), financial analysts, auditors and bond rating agencies. The extant literature has documented how each can play a vital role in monitoring firms, facilitating the production of firm-specific private information into public information (See Lang, Lins, and Miller (2002, LLM Hereafter)). The legal bonding hypothesis outlines how such additional disclosures and monitoring allows firms to effectively 'rent' the U.S. governance regime by listing on a U.S. exchange. Unlike exchange-level ADRs, Level 1 and Rule 144a firms are not required to become "reporting companies" under the U.S. disclosure and regulatory environment (e.g., Coffee (2002) ). Accordingly, the incremental protection benefits that accrue to the shareholders of cross-listing firms, if they do exist, apply only to exchange-listed ADRs. To be included in the final sample, I only include those firms for which data relating to both variants of our dependent variable is available, and exclude firms with either, missing (entirely) pre or post listing dividend payout data. This 'Narrow' sample approach is necessary to ensure that any conclusions that I make are not due to a significant change in our sample makeup around the cross-listing date. I obtain the non-cross listed sample After imposing these requirements, my final sample, outlined in detail in Table 1 I begin by reporting some summary payout measures for both cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms.
Data
The results are presented in Table 2 . For both variants of our dependent variable (Dividends-to-earnings and Dividends-to-cashflow), I calculate mean and median payout ratios over the full sample period. I outline summary measures for all cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms, and then further sub-divide the representative categories into firms originating from both high and low investor protection countries. Firms are characterised as either high or low investor protection firms according to their countries anti-directors right index (See LLSV (1998)).
At this point it is important that I make the distinction between payout ratios in calendar as opposed to event time. In Figures 1-12 , I plot the time series behaviour of all firms in calendar time (which are averaged over the sample period and presented in Table 2 ). Consequently, any interpretations made subsequently concern the level of the divided payout, and not changes in dividend payout that results from changes in domestic investor protection. In the next section, I examine the change in dividend payout, resulting from a hypothesised change in domestic investor protection. The relationship around the event date may be very different to the relationship that holds in calendar time. Consequently, I may find support in favour of both the outcome and substitution models of dividends: the outcome model in calendar time, and the substitution model in event time.
Liu (2002) provides similar arguments in her paper.
First, Level 1 firm's payout a higher percentage of their earnings as dividends than both exchange-listed and Rule 144a firms in calendar time (as opposed to event time). Second, non-cross-listed firms also pay out more dividends than both exchange-listed firms and Rule 144a firms, but pay slightly less (in terms of median payout) than Level 1 firms. These results are replicated when dividends-to-cashflow is employed as our dependent variable. Interestingly, the earlier relations are largely replicated for Level 1, Level 2/3, and Rule 144a firms from both high and low investor protection countries. The results for low investor countries are especially interesting. They show that Level 1 firms pay higher dividends than both exchange-listed and Rule 144a firms.
This result may be driven by anti-directors rights measure differences within the low investor protection class or it may point to a relation between firm-level governance and dividend payout. To examine this issue further, I
plot the time series behaviour of dividend-payout for cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms over the full sample In the next section I test the agency models of dividends in a dynamic setting by, allowing investor protection to change for at least a subset of our sample i.e. for Level 2/3 cross-listed firms. I hypothesise that if cross listing in the U.S. is associated with enhanced protection for the domestic investors of Level 2/3 listed firms; I should observe a change in ordinary dividend payout.
Econometric Specification
In this section I outline the empirical methodology. I compare the change in ordinary dividend payout for cross-listed firms relative to non-cross-listed firms around the cross-listing date. This is motivated by the fact that regulatory bonding in the U.S. is unobservable to the researcher. By examining the changes in ordinary dividend payout, I seek to isolate the impact of cross listing by controlling for firm, industry and country level determinants of ordinary dividend payout. Next, I allow this effect to vary across the different listing types using a simple dummy variable specification, and use this change in dividend payments made to ordinary shareholders to make inferences about how domestic investor protection has changed, post-listing.
To estimate the effect of cross listing on the ordinary dividend payout of firms, the following regression specification is followed: , , δ δ δ are parameters to be estimated. In the two-way fixed effects specification, these parameters estimate the 'causal' effect of cross listing on ordinary dividend payout within firms that change from not listing to listing i.e. the within estimates. 
Equations 3 and 4 are estimated using Pooled Tobit (e.g., Wooldridge (2002)). In all specifications the regression standard errors are robust to non-normality, heteroscedasticity and arbitrary within-group correlation (e.g., Hardin (2005)). I present results for the pooled Tobit model in Tables 5-6 and use the fixed effects estimates (unreported) to validate the results I report for the pooled Tobit model. (Div /CF) are negatively related to free cash flow, although neither is significant. The small variance inflation factors suggest that multicollinearity is not a significant problem in our data set.
I employ two country dummies to control for variations in dividend payout across legal regimes: a simple 0/1 dummy for legal origin: 1 if the country employs common law, and 0 otherwise (civil law). I also account for cross-country differences in investor protection; I classify those firms as firms from high investor protection countries if their anti-director score is equal to or greater than the median value of 3 (See LLSV (1998)). I control for payout differences across industries by classifying each firm according to their primary standard industry classification code. Hence, I form seven industry dummies; (1) agriculture, fishing, and forestry (2) mining and construction (3) manufacturing (4) transportation, communications, electric, gas and sanitary services (5) wholesale and retail trade (6) services and (7) public administration. I exclude all finance, insurance, and real estate firms (SIC beginning with 6).
I repeat the analysis by including American depositary receipt dividends as a covariate in each specification.
ADR dividends are ordinary share dividends paid to the holders of ADRs, converted to U.S. Dollars at the prevailing spot exchange rate. I have no prior beliefs on the sign of the coefficient. For example, cross-listed firms with a history of paying dividends may also be those to pay a dividend to their ADR shareholders. Furthermore, I
find that the inclusion of ADR dividends does not alter my main conclusions. All ADR dividend data is sourced from The Bank of New York (www.adrbny.com). All variables employed in our empirical analysis are defined in Table 3 .15.
Results
In Tables 5-8, I present the results estimating the effect of cross listing on the ordinary dividend payout of cross-listed firms. In Tables 5 and 6, I present the pooled Tobit results corresponding to Equation 3 for Dividends-to-Earnings and Dividends-to-Cashflow, respectively. In Tables 7 and 8 In all specifications, the country and firm level controls are highly significant and have the expected sign.
For example, larger and profitable firms pay higher dividends, while firms with sizable growth opportunities retain a sizable amount of earnings, rather than pay dividends. In line with my expectations, firms from common law countries with efficient legal and institutional frameworks pay significantly higher dividends (See LLSV (2000)).
Finally, I also document that firms that pay an ADR dividend also pay larger dividends suggesting a possible clientele effect.
In Table 6 , I examine the impact of cross listing on dividend policy for firms from countries with a poor record for protecting minority investors. Comparing Tables 5 and 6 the results suggest that although the magnitudes of the Tobit estimates are broadly similar, their significance is not as strong when compared to the results in Table 5 . This suggests that the benefits to listing may not be as great for firms from poor-investor protection countries, consistent with the notion that firm and country governance improvements are in fact complementary to one another.
The results for Rule 144a firms are consistent with theory. The results from Tables 5-6 suggest that cross listing in the U.S. confers no additional protection benefits for the ordinary shareholders of these firms. In almost all specifications Rule 144a firms do not significantly change the amount that they pay to their ordinary shareholders. The results for Level 1 firms are very interesting. In all regression specifications these firms pay significantly lower dividends, post-listing, a result consistent with the notion that like exchange-listed firms, these firms substitute dividends for enhanced governance. However, this result warrants further discussion. Level 1 firms are exempt from becoming 'reporting' companies under the terms of their depositary receipt agreement.
Consequently, our finding that these firms pay sizable and significantly lower dividends post-listing is inconsistent with any of the predictions of the legal bonding hypothesis. In the next sub-section I attempt to shed more light on this finding.
I report in Tables 7 and 8 our regression results using Dividends-to-Cashflow as our dependent variable.
The results are largely in line with those outlined when I employ Dividends-to-Earnings.
Firm-Level Governance
The Table 9 .
Here I outline for each depositary receipt level, the median value of closely held shares in the two years prior to listing, and on the list year. In the subsequent rows, I calculate the change in closely held shares between 7 Reputational bonding refers to bonding as a result of increased monitoring from reputational intermediaries e.g. analysts, underwriters, and auditors. A large literature suggests that it is only exchange-traded firms that benefit from reputational bonding after listing in the U.S. 
Concluding Remarks
The ability of firms to finance their investment opportunity set externally is largely contingent on the effectiveness of their domestic legal system to protect the interests of their minority shareholders. In this table I report mean and median dividend payout levels for non-cross-listed firms and cross-listed firms over the full sample period. Dividends-to-cashflow and dividends-to-earnings are employed as our payout proxies.
Both are defined in the appendix. Dividend payouts for all cross-listed firms are calculated over the full sample period for each firm, which includes both the pre and post-listing period. For both cross-listed and non-crosslisted firms I report both t and Z statistics for the mean and median difference between high and low investor protection countries, respectively. *, **, *** represents significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. difference between cross-listed and non cross-listed firms, in both the pre and post-listing period. Dividend-to-Earnings is employed as our payout proxy, and is defined in the appendix. Furthermore, I outline for each ADR Level the difference in dividend payouts, pre and post-listing. I test the equality of medians between cross-listed and non cross-listed firms using the Mann-Whitney test (Z-Statistic). *, **, *** represents significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. All firm level data is sourced from Worldscope and Datastream. All information on firms cross-listed in the U.S. are obtained from the Bank of New York, and cross-referenced with data provided by Deutsche-Bank, JP Morgan and Citibank. Rule 144a issues trade as private placements on PORTAL; Level 1 firms trade over-the-counter as pink sheet issues, and Level 2/3 trade on U.S. exchanges. difference between cross-listed and non cross-listed firms, in both the pre and post-listing period. Dividend-to-Cashflow is employed as our payout proxy, and is defined in the appendix. Furthermore, I outline for each ADR Level the difference in dividend payouts, pre and post-listing. I test the equality of medians between cross-listed and non cross-listed firms using the Mann-Whitney test (Z-Statistic). *, **, *** represents significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. All firm level data is sourced from Worldscope and Datastream. All information on firms cross-listed in the U.S. are obtained from the Bank of New York, and cross-referenced with data provided by Deutsche-Bank, JP Morgan and Citibank. Rule 144a issues trade as private placements on PORTAL; Level 1 firms trade over-the-counter as pink sheet issues, and Level 2/3 trade on U.S. exchanges. dy dx / [2] dy dx / [3] dy dx / [4] dy dx / dy dx / [2] dy dx / [3] dy dx / [4] dy dx / *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. The pooled Tobit standard errors are robust to nonnormality and heteroscedasticity in the errors and are also clustered by firm to account for arbitrary within-group correlations. Z-stats reported for the Pooled Tobit. In columns 1-4 I include but do not report the estimates of the firm level means. In all but one specification, an F-Test suggests that they are jointly significant at the 1% level. . For the dummy variables the marginal effects is calculated as the discrete change in F[x] as the dummy variable x changes from 0 to 1. Table 7 : Tobit Analysis of dividend policy of cross-listed firms -Dividend-to-Cashflow.
Variable Sign Pooled Tobit [1] dy dx / [2] dy dx / [3] dy dx / [4] dy dx / dy dx / [2] dy dx / [3] dy dx / [4] dy dx / of an explanatory variable on a constant and the remainder of the explanatory variables. ***, ** Represent significance at the 1 and 5% level of significance respectively.
